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Administration of Estates
Administration of Estates; temporary conservatorships
Penal Code §1370 (amended); Probate Code §2201.5 (new); §§1754,
2201 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §5353 (amended).
AB 1148 (Lanterman); STATS 1977, Ch 1237
Support: California Public Defender; California Rural Legal Assistance
Existing law provides for the establishment of a conservatorship for any
adult who requests such assistance or is found to be unable to properly care
for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing or shelter
[CAL. PROB. CODE §1751]. In addition, a conservatorship over an adult's
property may be established if he or she is found to be substantially unable
to manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or undue
influence [CAL. PROB. CODE §1754]. The law further allows any person,
other than a creditor of the proposed conservatee, to file a petition alleging
the need for a conservatorship based upon any one of the above reasons
[CAL. PROB. CODE §1754]. When a petition for the appointment of a
conservator is filed by a person other than a creditor of the potential
conservatee, the court, upon receipt of a verified petition establishing good
cause, may appoint a temporary conservator pending its final determination
of the need for a conservatorship [CAL. PROB.CODE §2201]. Consistent with
the purpose of Section 2201 of the Probate Code, the powers and duties of a
temporary conservator are limited to those actions that are needed to "pro-
vide for the temporary care, maintenance and support of the conservatee" or
to protect the property of the conservatee from loss or injury [Compare CAL.
PROB. CODE §2201 with In re Gray, 12 Cal. App. 3d 513, 534, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 776, 782-83 (1970)]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1237, howev-
er, there were no specific limitations on the powers or duties of temporary
conservators that prohibited them from removing a conservatee from his or
her place of residence or relinquishing a conservatee's real or personal
property [See CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1902, §1, at 3319].
Chapter 1237 amends Section 2201 of the Probate Code to preclude a
temporary conservator from changing the residence of a conservatee without
prior court approval except in the event of an emergency [CAL. PROB. CODE
§2201.5]. An emergency exists for the purpose of Chapter 1237 if the
proposed conservatee's residence is uninhabitable or if the conservatee "has
a medical condition that presents an immediate threat" to his or her physical
survival [CAL. PROB. CODE §2201.5]. A temporary conservator, however,
must file a written request seeking court approval of the change of residence
within one judicial day following the emergency removal of a conservatee
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[CAL. PROB. CODE §2201.51. If the conservatee is moved to a health
facility for treatment and has given his or her informed consent to this move,
the temporary conservator need not seek court approval [CAL. PROB. CODE
§2201.51.
Court authorization validating an emergency change of residence or
approving a proposed nonemergency change of residence must be obtained
by filing a written request with an application for conservatorship, or if a
temporary conservatorship has already been established, then this request
must be separately filed [CAL. PROB. CODE §2201]. Furthermore, this
request must specify: (1) the location of the proposed residence; (2) the
precise reasons why the conservatee "will suffer irreparable harm if such
change of residence is not permitted"; and (3) why means less restrictive to
the conservatee's liberty will not suffice to prevent such harm [CAL. PROB.
CODE §2201]. Within seven days of a temporary conservator's request to
change the residence of the conservatee, the court is required to conduct a
hearing at which the conservatee must be present, unless attendance would
jeopardize his or her physical health, be represented by counsel, and have
the right to confront and cross-examine any witness [CAL. PROB. CODE
§2201]. If the court by "a preponderance of the evidence" can demonstrate
that a change of residence is necessary to "prevent irreparable harm to the
conservatee," it may issue an order approving the move and specifying the
exact location to which the conservatee may be moved [CAL. PROB. CODE
§2201]. Further, Section 2201 makes it a felony for the conservator to
remove the conservatee from the State of California unless he or she
additionally shows that such removal is required to permit nonpsychiatric
medical treatment, that the conservatee has consented to this treatment, and
that such treatment is essential to the conservatee's physical survival [CAL.
PROB. CODE §2201].
If the court gives the temporary conservator authorization to move the
conservatee, it must also order the conservator to take all reasonable steps to
preserve the conservatee's previous place of residence, and, under no
circumstances, to sell or relinquish any lease or estate in real or personal
property "used as or within the conservatee's place of residence" [CAL.
PROB. CODE §2201]. Section 2201 also requires the court to prohibit the sale
of any estate or interest in other real or personal property belonging to a
conservatee without the specific approval of the court, which may be
granted only upon a clear showing that a sale is necessary "to avert
irreparable harm to the conservatee" [CAL. PROB. CODE §2201].
Similarly, under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§5000-5368], a conservatorship may be recommended for an indi-
vidual based upon a determination by specified professionals that the indi-
vidual is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder or impaired by
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chronic alcoholism [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5352]. Based upon either
this determination or other independent investigations, the court may estab-
lish a temporary conservatorship pending a determination of the need for
more permanent supervision [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5352.1]. The
temporary conservator appointed in this manner is required to make all
necessary arrangements for the conservatee's food, shelter and care, giving
preference to those arrangements that will allow the conservatee to return to
his or her home, family or friends [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5353].
Previously, however, there were no restrictions under this act regulating the
power of temporary conservators to sell or relinquish the residence or other
real or personal property owned by a conservatee [CAL. STATS. 1972, c.
574, §3, at 982]. Section 5353 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as
amended by Chapter 1237, now requires a court to order a temporary
conservator to preserve the conservatee's previous place of residence and to
prohibit the temporary conservator from selling or relinquishing any lease
or estate in real or personal property "used as or within the conservatee's
place of residence." Furthermore, the sale of any estate or interest in other
real or personal property of the conservatee is also prohibited unless the
conservator is able to show the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
such action is necessary to avert "irreparable harm to the conservatee"
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5353]. Thus, Chapter 1237 appears to expand
protection for a temporary conservatee by restricting the manner in which he
or she may be removed from his or her residence by a temporary conservator
and establishing procedures for protection of the conservatee's residence in
his or her absence.
COMMENT
In 1976 the California Legislature amended the Probate Code in an
apparent effort to ensure that the requirements of procedural due process
were satisfied in all conservatorship and guardianship proceedings [See
CAL. PROB. CODE §§1461, 1754, 1754.1]. This legislation, however, did
not require the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing for proceedings
involving the appointment of, or actions taken by, a temporary conservator
[See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1357, at -]. Arguably, this was partially due to
a California appellate court holding that an ex parte appointment of a
temporary conservator does not violate due process [In re Gray, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 513, 524, 90 Cal. Rptr. 776, 782-83 (1970)]. Nevertheless, actions
by a temporary conservator to remove a conservatee from this state or
dispose of his or her property have not been subjected to similar judicial
scrutiny.
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Historically, medieval lords created guardianships for the protection of
incompetents in their jurisdiction by exercising their power under the doc-
trine of parens patriae [Comment, Limitations on Individual Rights in
California Incompetency Proceedings, 7 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 457, 459-60
(1974)]. This power remains viable today and is used by states, in a parental
rather than an adversary role, to assume responsibility for certain juveniles
and mentally impaired citizens [Id.; see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966)]. While the doctrine of parens patriae has apparently been
used in the past to justify reduced due process protections [Comment,
Limitations on Individual Rights in California Incompetency Proceedings, 7
U. CAL. D. L. REv. 457, 477 (1974)], the United States Supreme Court has
indicated, in cases involving the exercise of this power over juveniles and
mentally disordered persons, that only emergency situations can justify a
reduction of procedural due process safeguards [See O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975)]. Accordingly, to protect the person and property
of a conservatee in emergency situations, a temporary conservator may be
appointed without satisfying the notice and hearing requirements of due
process [See In re Gray, 12 Cal. App. 3d 513, 524, 90 Cal. Rptr. 776, 782-
83 (1970); CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CONSER-
VATORSHIPS §3.24 (emergency appointments) (1968)]. Once a temporary
conservator is appointed and the immediate threat of loss to the conservatee
has been eliminated, it is arguable that further nonemergency actions by the
temporary conservator can only be taken after the notice and hearing
requirements of due process have been satisfied [See Comment, Probate
Code Conservatorships: A Legislative Grant of New Procedural Protec-
tions, 8 PAC. L.J. 73, 92 (1977)]. Consistent with this conclusion, Chapter
1237 has amended the Probate Code to require notice and a hearing in
nonemergency situations in which a temporary conservator proposes to
change a conservatee's residence or dispose of any of the conservatee's
personal or real property [See CAL. PROB. CODE §§2201, 2201.5; CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §5353]. Thus, Chapter 1237 appears to complete the
work begun on the law governing conservatorships in 1976 by extending
due process guarantees to temporary conservatees in nonemergency situa-
tions.
See Generally:
1) 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate (powers and duties of
temporary conservator) (8th ed. 1974).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CONSERVATORSHIPS §§8.1-.63 (conser-
vatorships under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act) (Supp. 1976).
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Administration of Estates; guardians-accounting of Veterans'
Administration receipts
Probate Code §1657 (amended).
AB 279 (Bannai); STATS 1977, Ch 39
Support: State Bar of California; Veterans' Administration
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 39, guardians of wards receiving
payments from the Veterans' Administration were required to file an annual
account with the court and the appropriate office of the Veterans' Adminis-
tration [CAL. STATS. 1955, c. 950, §1, at 1836]. Section 1657 still provides
for an annual accounting, but now gives the court the alternative of requiring
accountings at any interval it deems appropriate.
It is arguable that the justification for this amendment lies in the fact that
outlays from the Veterans' Administration are small subsistence payments
made at regular intervals in consistent amounts, thus minimizing the possi-
bility of misusing these funds and making the cost of an annual report
somewhat unjustified [Letter from Harold F. Bradford, Legislative Repre-
sentative to the State Bar of California (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal)]. Further, the reduced accounting requirement provided for by
Chapter 39 does not appear to jeopardize a ward's funds since Section 1656
of the Probate Code still requires that guardians file a bond that is worth
either the probable annual income of the ward if the bond is provided by an
authorized surety, or twice the ward's probable annual income in all other
cases [See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 1480]. In addition, a ward whose
funds have been misused retains the right to sue the principal on the bond as
often as necessary to recover any amount of damages [See CAL. PROB.
CODE §554(b)].
Under federal law a guardian is also required to render an account to the
Administrator of the Veterans' Administration, but he or she is required to
make accountings only "from time to time" [38 U.S.C. §3202 (1970)]. The
Veterans' Administration, however, has indicated that it would be willing to
agree to biannual or triannual accountings in many cases [STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNmA, 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 8-17]. Thus, it would appear
that the provisions of Chapter 39 will not conflict with the guardian account
requirements imposed by federal law or suggested by the Veterans' Admin-
istration and will apparently reduce the inconvenience and financial burden
on guardians of wards receiving Veterans' Administration payments who
must make these periodic accountings.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CONSERVATORSHIP §3.2 (veteran's con-
servator) (1968).
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Administration of Estates; bequests of community property to a
surviving spouse
Probate Code §204 (amended).
AB 1716 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 334
Support: State Bar of California
Under existing law, if a husband or wife dies intestate, or if he or she dies
testate and by will bequeaths all or part of his or her interest in community
property to the surviving spouse, this property passes to the survivor without
the necessity of being subjected to probate administration [CAL. PROB.
CODE §202]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 334, however, if the
deceased spouse bequeathed community property in such a manner as to
cause its ownership to be "qualified," such property was subjected to
administration by the probate courts [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 173, §4, at
319].
Pursuant to Section 680 of the Civil Code ownership of property is
qualified when one or more of the following are present: (1) the ownership
is shared with one or more persons; (2) the time of enjoyment is deferred or
limited; or (3) the use of the property is restricted. Under this definition of
"qualified ownership," the law prior to the enactment of Chapter 334
apparently included community property that passed under a will containing
a survival clause that conditioned bequeathment upon survival of the living
spouse for 30 days, 90 days or six months [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
COMM. ON PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, INTERIM REPORT No. 3 (Jan. 6,
1977)]. The use of such a clause, however, purportedly avoids the legal
problems arising from simultaneous deaths and avoids probating the com-
munity property assets twice when a spouse survives the other by only a
short period of time [CONINuiNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
WILL DRAFTING §9.41 (1965)]. Thus, under prior law, attempts to avoid
possible probate problems by means of a survival clause in a decedent's will
would arguably have caused his or her interest in community property to be
characterized as being in a "qualified ownership" status and would have
required the property to be probated a second time by the surviving spouse's
estate even though he or she outlived the other spouse for only a short period
of time [See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 173, §4, at 319].
To avoid this additional cost and to remove any ambiguity surrounding
the term "qualified ownership," Chapter 334 amends Section 204 of the
Probate Code to specifically state that a bequest or devise of community
property conditioned upon the survival of the other spouse for a specified
period does not create a "qualified ownership" in such property. Thus, if
the surviving spouse lives for the period specified in a survival clause, the
property need not be probated at all while on the other hand, if he or she
does no, live through the survival period, the property need only be probated
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by the estate of the spouse that died first [See CAL. PROB. CODE §202]. In
any event, the surviving spouse or his or her representative may still elect to
have the decedent's interest in the community property subjected to probate
administration pursuant to Section 202(b) of the Probate Code [See 7 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 109(d) (8th
ed. 1975), (Supp. 1976)]. Thus, Chapter 334 would appear to allow attor-
neys to continue using foresight and initiative in drafting wills without
simultaneously incurring additional costs for their client's estate.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING §1150 (advisability of
short survival periods) (Supp. 1976).
Administration of Estates; time limitations-foreign creditors'
claims and will contests
Probate Code §§380, 707 (amended).
AB 658 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 217
Support: California Bankers Association; California Land Title Associa-
tion; State Bar of California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 217, foreign creditors who could show
by affidavit that they had not received a creditor's notice from a decedent's
estate because of their absence from the state, were allowed to file claims
against the estate based upon contracts, funeral expenses, or damages for
injury to person or property any time prior to the entry of a final decree of
distribution [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1226, §3, at 2374]. Furthermore, under
the prior law, the claims made by these foreign creditors were allowed to
reach property distributed before the claims were filed [See CAL. STATS.
1971, c. 1226, §3, at 2374]. This indefinite limitation on the filing of
foreign creditor claims has apparently hindered probate administration and
often delayed the closing of estates [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
COMMITTEE ON PROBATE AND TRUST LAW INTERIM REPORT Item 1 (March
18, 1976)].
Chapter 217 amends Section 707 of the Probate Code to require out of
state creditors to file their claims within one year after the expiration of the
filing deadline for instate creditors' claims and prior to the filing of a
petition for final distribution [CAL. PROB. CODE §707(a)]. Section 707 has
been further amended to exempt all property distributed pursuant to a court
order and payments properly made prior to the filing of these claims [CAL.
PROB. CODE §707(a)]. These amendments to Section 707 would appear to
facilitate the administration of decedents' estates by providing a definite cut-
off date after which an administrator or executor may expeditiously deter-
mine the extent of the obligations against an estate and the available assets
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with which to satisfy these obligations [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
COMMITTEE ON PROBATE AND TRUST LAW INTERIM REPORT Item I (March
18, 1976)]. The imposition of a time limit on out of state claims would also
appear to aid in estate tax planning by enabling executors to more rapidly
determine an estate's gross income and estate and income tax liabilities [See
Comment, Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent to Date of
Death, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 654, 655-58 (1975)].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 217, the law provided that interested
parties could commence will contests "at any time within four months after
such probate" [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 124, §1, at 270]. When a will is
admitted to probate by the court, such action "must be recorded in the
minutes by the clerk, with the notation: 'Admitted to probate. . .' " [CAL.
PROB. CODE §322], and the fact of admission of a will to probate may
subsequently be set forth in a formal order that becomes part of the court's
file [See CAL. PROB. CODE §1221]. Since the formal order and the recorded
action in the minutes of the court may have different dates, there apparently
existed some ambiguity under the prior law as to which date controlled in
determining the limits of the four month period within which to commence a
past probate will contest [See Wolfson v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 60
Cal. App. 3d 153, 158-59, 131 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268-69 (1976)]. In Wolfson
v. Los Angeles Superior Court [60 Cal. App. 3d 153, 131 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1976)], however, one appellate court decided that this will contest period
begins running on the date the clerk enters the notation of admission to
probate in the minute order since that is the date on which the judicial
decision took place [Id. at 159, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 269].
Chapter 217 codifies the position taken by the court in Wolfson by
providing that the will contest period commences on "the date the court
admits the will to probate as recorded in the minutes by the clerk pursuant to
the provisions of Section 322" of the Probate Code [Compare CAL. PROB.
CODE §380 with Wolfson v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d
153, 157, 131 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267 (1976)]. To further eliminate any
ambiguity in the application of Section 380, Chapter 217 also provides that
this will contest period extends for 120 days instead of four months from the
date of entry in the minutes [CAL. PROB. CODE §380]. Thus, Chapter 217
would appear to facilitate the administration of estates in California by
establishing certainty in the time period within which foreign creditors may
file claims against an estate and within which individuals may commence
post probate will contests [See CAL. PROB. CODE §§380, 707].
See Generally:
1) Estate of Emilel Bankhead, 60 T.C. 535 (1973) (affect on federal estate tax when claim is
filed late).
2) 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §410 (type of notice
required) (8th ed. 1974).
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Administration of Estates; public administration of decedent's
estate
Probate Code § 1141 (amended).
AB 786 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 150
Support: California Bankers Association; California State Public Ad-
ministrators; Public Guardian Association
Section 1141 of the Probate Code requires the public administrator of
each county to take immediate charge of any decedent's property in his or
her county when no executor or administrator has been appointed and, as a
consequence, the property is being wasted, lost or uncared for. Under prior
law, when an administrator took charge of such an estate, without letters of
administration being issued, or under order of a court, he or she was
required to procure letters of administration before conducting any search
for a will or burial instructions or proceeding further with the administration
of the estate [See CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 61, §1, at 77]. Chapter 150 amends
Section 1141 of the Probate Code to authorize the administrator to begin an
immediate search for a will and burial instructions upon taking charge of an
estate without first obtaining any letters of administration. Section 1141 also
allows the administrator to extend this search to any safe deposit box held in
the sole name of the decedent by a financial institution if the administrator
can furnish written certification showing reasonable grounds to believe that
he or she is entitled to administer the estate. At the same time, financial
institutions are absolved from any liability for granting access to the box,
even if they do not inquire into the truth of any of the facts stated in the
certification [CAL. PROB. CODE § 1141].
In addition to precluding any cause of action for granting unauthorized
access, Section 1141 requires the estate of the decedent to bear any costs
incurred for drilling or forcing open the safe deposit box. If the adminis-
trator finds a will, he or she is required to deliver it to the clerk of the
superior court having jurisdiction over the estate, or to the "executor named
therein in like manner as a custodian is required to do by Section 320" of the
Probate Code [CAL. PROB. CODE §1141]. Section 1141 also requires the
administrator to deliver any located burial instructions to the persons au-
thorized by Section 7100 of the Health and Safety Code to control the
decedent's remains. If no will is found designating a proper administrator
and the estate is uncared for, or if a will is found, but there are no heirs
qualified to be administrators, Section 1141 requires the public adminis-
trator to procure letters of administration with all convenient dispatch [See 7
B. WTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §287 (8th
ed. 1974)].
In the past, the requirement that a public administrator had to obtain
Selected 1977 California Legislation
Administration of Estates
letters of administration before conducting a search for a decedent's will or
burial instructions was apparently a cause of delay in finding these docu-
ments. This conclusion logically follows from the fact that a financial
institution usually required proof of death of the safety deposit box owner
before granting access [CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §6.5 (1971)]. Any delay in obtaining
the will or burial instructions apparently postponed the preparations of the
decedent's remains for burial since funeral directors were first required to
complete a death certificate [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10201], which
called for information found in these documents [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 10202]. Thus, the delay inherent in these procedures not only slowed
the administration of the estate, but also created the possibility of burying a
decedent in a manner contrary to his or her wishes because of the public
administrator's inability to find burial instructions in time.
By authorizing public administrators to gain immediate access to safe
deposit boxes held solely in the name of the decedent, Chapter 150 enables
these administrators to avoid the delay inherent in the requirement of first
obtaining letters of administration. Thus, Chapter 150 would seem not
only to expedite the entire administration of the decedent's estate, but also
would appear to ensure that any existing burial instructions are located in a
timely fashion by providing a more efficient method of establishing the
existence or nonexistence of these documents [See CAL. PROB. CODE
§114.1].
See Generally:
1) 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §287 (duties of public
administrator) (8th ed. 1974).
Administration of Estates; option sales of estate property and
credit sales of guardianship property
Probate Code §584.3 (new); §§591.2, 591.6, 1200, 1240, 1532
(amended).
AB 673 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 243
Support: California Bankers Association; State Bar of California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 243, the law authorized administrators
and executors to sell real or personal property belonging to an estate, but did
not provide such persons with the authority to grant options to purchase
estate property [See CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 390, §1, at 732].
Chapter 243 adds Section 584.3 to the Probate Code to allow an executor
or administrator, with court approval, to grant an option to purchase real
property, which may remain in effect for a period within or beyond the
administration of the estate. To obtain court approval, Section 584.3 re-
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quires the personal representative to: (1) file a verified petition with the
clerk describing the property; (2) state the terms and conditions of the
option; (3) mail notice of the hearing to all known heirs, devisees, and
legatees at least ten days before the hearing; (4) show the advantage to the
estate in giving the option; and (5) show the purchase price to be at least 90
percent of the appraised value of the land, as determined by a referee within
90 days prior to the filing of the petition. Section 584.3 also requires the
clerk to set the petition for hearing and to give notice pursuant to Section
1200 of the Probate Code, which requires the clerk to post notice of the
hearing at the courthouse at least ten days before the day of the hearing. The
court may then approve the petition if it appears that "good reason exists
. . . that [the granting of an option to purchase] will be to the advantage of
the estate," and that there does not appear to be an offer exceeding the
purchase price of the real property subject to the option or a better offer with
respect to the terms of the option [CAL. PROB. CODE §584.3]. If a higher
offer appears to exist relative to the purchase price, Section 584.3 indicates
that the provisions of Section 785 of the Probate Code, which authorize the
court to direct the estate to accept any written offer that is at least ten percent
more than the first $10,000 of the previous bid and five percent more than
the amount of the previous bid exceeding $10,000, shall apply. A
better offer with respect to the terms of the option "shall be one deemed to
be materially more advantageous to the estate" [CAL. PROB. CODE
§584.3(d)] and apparently must be chosen over the lesser offer. This
conclusion appears correct since Section 584.3(d) directs the court to ap-
prove an option to purchase only when it can be shown that it will be "to the
advantage of the estate for the option to be granted, and it does not appear
that . . . a better offer with respect to terms of the option, may be
obtained."
If an option is granted pursuant to Section 584.3 that extends beyond the
administration of the estate, the decree of final distribution must provide that
the property involved in the option will be distributed subject to the terms
and conditions of the option [CAL. PROB. CODE §584.3(e)]. Further, the
recording of granted purchase options, regardless of whether they are within
or beyond the administration of an estate, will now serve as notice to
subsequent purchasers for only one year following the expiration of the
option [See CAL. PROB. CODE §584.3(e). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE
§1213.5].
In addition, Chapter 243 makes other conforming changes in the Probate
Code that reflect an administrator's or executor's new power to grant
options to purchase estate property [See CAL. PROB. CODE §§591.2, 591.6,
1200, 1240, 1532]. This power is now granted to executors and adminis-
trators who have been given the authority to administer an estate both with
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and without court supervision [CAL. PROB. CODE §§591.2, .6]. Further,
once an order granting an option to purchase real property has been given,
Section 1240 now provides for the right to seek an appeal from such an
order.
One potential problem with the addition of Section 584.3 to the Probate
Code, however, may exist in the provision of the new law that states that an
option to purchase will be granted only if "good reason exists and. . . it
will be to the advantage of the estate" [CAL. PROB. CODE §584.3(d)].
Existing law authorizes the representative to sell estate property when it is
necessary "to pay debts, legacies, family allowance or expenses" or when
"it is for the advantage, benefit and best interests of the estate" [CAL.
PROB. CODE §754 (emphasis added)]. Section 584.3, however, dealing with
option sales of estate property, appears to make no distinction between a
necessary sale and an advantageous sale, and this omission may be indica-
tive of the legislature's intent to preclude option sales for the purpose of
paying debts [Cf. 1 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §14.3 (1971) (discussion of language
necessary to provide mandatory and discretionary power of sale to an estate
representative)]. These changes in the Probate Code involving option sales
appear to be a response to difficulties faced by potential purchasers who did
not want to complete a purchase until certain problems were resolved such
as tests to determine the possible uses of vacant land that the administrator
or executor desired to sell [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON
PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, INTERIM REPORT at 1 (Jan. 6, 1977)]. This
problem was particularly applicable to large land developers who apparently
need time to get administrative approval of environmental impact reports
before construction may begin [See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§21100].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 243, Section 1532 of the Probate Code
provided that the terms of any credit extended for the purchase of real or
personal property held by a guardian of a ward could not exceed ten years
[CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 1257, §1, at 3395]. Apparently, this ten year
limitation on such credit sales was inconsistent with common real estate
financing practices and resulted in the loss of valuable sales revenue to
estates [STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 7-12].
Chapter 243 amends Section 1532 to extend to 20 years the maximum term
allowable for credit sales of any real or personal property held by guardians.
Thus, Chapter 243 would appear to greatly aid administrators of estates by
enabling them to offer purchase options on estate property to buyers who
desire an extended holding period before concluding a sale [See CAL. PROB.
CODE §584.3] and to allow guardians of estate property to offer financing
arrangements that are competitive with present bank lending practices [See
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Administration of Estates
CAL. PROB. CODE §1532; STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION 7-12].
See Generally:
1) Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1972) (applying environmental impact report requirements to private developers).
2) 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §§460, 461 (when estate
property may be sold) (8th ed. 1974).
3) 1 CONTINUING EDICATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
§14.3 (sales advantageous to the estate) (1971).
Administration of Estates; notice requirements for filling vacan-
cies in the office of trustee
Probate Code § 1125 (amended).
AB 373 (McVittie); STATS 1977, Ch 88
Support: State Bar of California
Section 1125 of the Probate Code has been modified to clarify the type of
notice that is required before a court may fill a vacancy in the office of
trustee under a will. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 88, the law provided
that a vacancy in the office of trustee could be filled only after all interested
parties had been given notice as required upon a petition for the probate of a
will [CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 969, §15, at 2496]. Upon filing a petition for
probate of a will, the Probate Code currently requires the clerk of the court
to give notice of the hearing by newspaper publication or, if there is none,
posting notices at least ten days before the hearing [CAL. PROB. CODE §327]
and requires the petitioner to give notice to designated interested parties by
personal service or service by mall no less than ten days before the hearing
[CAL. PROB. CODE §328].
In applying these notice requirements to proceedings to fill trustee vacan-
cies, it appears that it may have been the practice in some courts to only
require personal service or service by mail, while others required notifica-
tion by both publication and personal service [See STATE BAR OF CALIFOR-
NIA, 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 8-7]. Chapter 88 has been enacted to
eliminate this potential confusion by specifying that notice by personal
service or service by mail, pursuant to Section 328 of the Probate Code, is
the only method of notification that need be followed in these proceedings
[See CAL. PROB. CODE §1125]. This simplification of the notice require-
ments under Section 1125 does not appear to reduce the effectiveness of the
notice given, since all of the parties who are interested in the trust will have
been personally served or served by mail pursuant to Section 328 [STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 8-7]. Rather, Chapter
88 seems to clarify these notice requirements by clearly indicating that in
proceedings to fill trustee vacancies, the provisions of Section 327, which
require notice by publication or posting, are superfluous.
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